An economist reports from Baghdad: reviving the Iraqi economy in the aftermath of war by Chris Foote
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>>>> AN ECONOMIST REPORTS FROM BAGHDAD >>>
pitch-black midsummer
night in Baghdad, and
I’m standing outside the
Republican Palace, hoping for a ride back
to my hotel. Four giant busts of Saddam
Hussein sit atop the palace roof and look
down on me as I wait. In the darkness, I hear
occasional bursts of gunfire, but I know the
shots are not fired in anger. Hours earlier, up
in Mosul, Saddam’s sadistic sons, Uday and
Qusay, met their ends in a hail of American
bullets. Just moments ago, standing in the
palace, I saw the American military com-
mander arrive to confirm news of their deaths.
(His smile was so bright it cut through the
darkness of the dimly-lit rotunda.) Residents
of Baghdad are so ecstatic to learn that Uday
and Qusay will not be around to terrorize
them anymore that they celebrate in their fa-
vorite way—by blasting gunfire into the air.
Unfortunately, what goes up must come
down, and the bus drivers who shuttle coali-
tion workers back and forth between the
palace and the Al-Rasheed Hotel worry that
some  bullets  will  come  down  on  them.
They’ve suspended the shuttle service for the
evening, which has stranded me, after mid-
night, without a ride home. 
I could walk back to the hotel if I wanted. The area between
the palace and the hotel lies within the “green zone,” completely
protected by the U.S. Army. But it’s a long walk—about 1.5
miles—and it’s still hot outside. (July temperatures in Baghdad
range from 80 to 110 degrees.) Also, the walk takes me uncom-
fortably near Iraq’s Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and the
“crossed swords” monument where Saddam used to review his
troops. I decide to take my chances hitching a ride on an Army
Humvee passing on the road in front of the palace. But it’s been
about 15 minutes, and no luck. So I wait. 
talking with people now about my summer stint as an
economist in Baghdad is not easy. Everyone wants to know:
“What was it like over there?” Sometimes I’m tempted to an-
swer, “I don’t know, what was it like back here?” Every big
place—the United States, Iraq, Boston—has millions of sto-
ries, millions of people embedding their private lives amid the
wider world around them. I can’t hope to summarize “what’s
going on” in Iraq with a few sentences. I can only talk about
my own experiences. 
People are often surprised to learn that I rarely felt in danger
during the entire three months I was there. My feeling of safe-
ty came partly from the fact that I spent most of my time en-
sconced on the second floor of the Republican Palace, which
by July had become one of the best-fortified bits of real estate
in Asia. It also may have stemmed from my native Midwest-
ern trust: I’m an economist, not a soldier. I came to help Iraq’s
economy get moving. Why would anyone want to hurt me?
My typical workday starts at 8:00 a.m. and lasts until 11:00
p.m. (Everyone in the palace works long hours.) My job is to
help Peter McPherson, the coalition’s director of economic pol-
icy, answer macroeconomic questions. In many ways, the job
is similar to the one I held at the Council of Economic Advis-
ers (CEA) before coming to Iraq. There the economic questions
changed from day to day, sometimes from hour to hour. Bagh-
dad is the same. What is the best way to fix Iraq’s currency?
How could foreign investment help Iraq? What tariff regime
should we recommend? The questions are all over the map, so
I draw more from my experience teaching macroeconomics to
undergraduates, and less from my own specialized research. 
The macroeconomic model I take with me to Iraq is simple:
In the long run, markets and prices allocate resources efficiently,
so it’s best to keep government interventions in the market to a
minimum. But in the short run, prices don’t adjust to chang-
ing circumstances right away, leading to temporary problems
like recessions. Because the U.S. economy is set up well, the
problems at the CEA were usually of the short-run variety. Iraq
is different. Under Saddam, Iraq’s economy was riddled with
corruption, inefficiency, and waste. The looting and sabotage
to the country’s infrastructure immediately after the war made
things worse. The job of the economists I work with is to sta-
bilize the economy from the immediate effects of the war, then
help to put the country on a solid long-run foundation.
One of the toughest problems Iraq faces is what to do about
its state-owned industries. After the British-installed monarchy
was overthrown in 1958, successive Iraqi governments tried to
diversify the economy by building state-run factories. Because
these factories were owned by the government and not by pri-
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vate investors, many of them became models of inefficiency,
surviving only through government subsidies. An important
part of economic reform will be to reduce these subsidies and
divert government revenue to more productive uses, such as in-
vestments in education, transportation, and the oil industry. But
reducing subsidies too quickly or too much would force many
state-run factories out of business, worsening the unemploy-
ment problem.
Cutting the subsidies to consumers may prove even more dif-
ficult. Iraq’s oil exports were prohibited by the United Nations
after its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Since 1996, Iraq has been able
to export specified amounts of oil under an “oil-for-food” pro-
gram run by the United Nations. Iraq’s government distributed
the food and other goods it purchased through this program at
prices far below their market values. A nominal fee of 250 di-
nars (about 15 cents) buys a month’s food ration. Subsidies also
extend to goods produced inside Iraq—four cents gets a gal-
lon of gas. In the long run, these prices will have to rise if the
economy is to have the right market incentives, but price in-
creases will also have to come about as part of an overall pro-
gram that maintains Iraqis’ living standards. 
Like doctors performing triage, we leave these reforms for 
later. More pressing concerns include restarting the banking
system, which is crucial for resuscitating the country’s private
sector.  Postwar  looting  damaged  many  of  the  300+  bank
branches. To reopen them, we move cash around the country
under military guard. Figuring out which banks can open, and
when, takes up countless meetings for several weeks.
Early on, I visit Iraq’s Central Bank, which was also de-
stroyed by looters. Our mission is to check on the Treasure of
Nimrud, a collection of ancient Assyrian jewelry that was stored
in the bank’s vault for safekeeping in the early 1990s. The bank’s
basement was flooded with sewage water during the looting and
has only recently been drained. Our group trudges down the
unlit, still slimy stairs, careful not to slip. When we reach the
bottom, I see that the corner of one of the vault doors has been
peeled away, as if by a giant can opener. I am told that during
the postwar chaos, someone tried to open this door with a rock-
et-propelled grenade, incinerating himself in the process. (The
lock in the door held.) The deputy head of the Central Bank
jiggles a number of keys and opens another door nearby. We
are happy to learn that the treasures are intact.
Another financial problem we face concerns Iraq’s currency.
Only two denominations of the “Saddam dinar” circulate wide-
ly—one worth about $5, another worth about 15 cents. Some
of the plates and paper to make the larger note have been stolen,
so everyone worries about counterfeits. This fear has caused the
larger bill to trade at a discount to the smaller one, making it im-
possible to pay government salaries in the local currency and
forcing Iraqis to carry bags of the smaller bills whenever they
go shopping. We decide to start printing the smaller bills in an
effort to raise their supply and thereby cut the discount. Yet the
discount remains stubbornly positive, making our jobs that
much harder. 
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with residents of Mosul at a stopover during
his flight to Baghdad in late May.
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sorting out these problems often leaves us frustrated.
At our daily meetings, tempers can be short. Our frustrations
stem from the workload, from the 6,000 miles that separate us
from our families and friends, and from the oppressive Bagh-
dad heat. We sweat over laptops and gulp down bottles of wa-
ter until the palace’s air conditioner is fixed at the end of June.
But the Iraqis we work with go home to much worse conditions. 
I come to appreciate my room back at the Al-Rasheed Ho-
tel a great deal by the time the summer ends. Coalition work-
ers fill the hotel, which (like the palace) is heavily guarded. My
room is on the ninth floor, and from my window, I have a great
view of Baghdad. I love to look out the window, whenever the
hotel’s electricity goes out—which happens every few days—
to see how much of the city is dark. During the day, I can see
a number of smoke-damaged buildings, including one that
looks like a bombed-out ziggurat. Straight down, I see the wing
of the Al-Rasheed that houses a number of restaurants and
shops. The roof is covered with eight-pointed stars, the symbol
of the Baath party. 
In the hotel coffee shop one day, a woman who grew up in
the Kurdish part of Iraq spends two hours telling me of life un-
der the Baathists. When she was a girl, her father had to flee
for his life, and his family hid from Saddam’s men for months
in their own house. They later escaped by foot over the moun-
tains to Iran. She also tells me of a 16-year-old boy she knew.
At school one day, the boy made a single, offhand comment dis-
paraging the regime. After he got home, policemen visited his
house, called him outside, shot him dead, and threw a piece of
paper on his body—an order to his family not to give him a
proper Islamic burial. His father disobeyed and buried his son
with the appropriate ceremony. The men came back later and
shot the father.
Over lunch in the palace cafeteria, two young Iraqi women
working as translators tell me that they never talked politics in
the old days. You didn’t know if someone would turn you in
for what you said. “I’m even a little nervous talking about this
now,” one of them said as she ate her lunch alongside dozens
of U.S. troops. 
While many Baghdad residents grow frustrated with the pace
of the reconstruction during the summer, ending Saddam’s
regime has earned the coalition a great deal of goodwill. Chil-
dren—Iraq’s least political residents—seem to appreciate us
the most. When I end a visit to the Central Bank or Ministry
of Planning to go back to the palace, I typically see my mili-
tary escorts hanging out with curious kids from the city. The
children seem fascinated with all things American—especial-
ly Army paraphernalia—and they peer at me through a back-
seat window as my SUV inches its way down Baghdad’s
crowded streets. One of the best pictures I took in Iraq shows
two boys, each about 11 or 12 years old, pressing their faces up
to my window, as if I am a strange goldfish in a bowl. 
I often wish I could hop out of my fish bowl and learn more
about Iraq’s economy by talking with people in the streets.
Much of what I learn comes from the Iraqi economists with
whom I work. We share a similar language and way of think-
ing, even though their English is sometimes halting and my
Arabic is nonexistent. As economists, they speak with special
sadness about the economic tragedies of the past. One Central
Bank official told me of not being able to give his children the
same standard of living his father gave him. “I was in kinder-
garten in the 1950s, but now I can’t send my children to kinder-
garten,” he said. “It costs too much money.” Another, who
holds a Ph.D. from a British university, recounts the time he
wanted to figure the nation’s balance-of-payments accounts us-
ing accurate methods. His bosses said no—they didn’t want
to publish bad news. 
It amazes me that a sliver of Iraq’s population wants to see
those days return. Although I personally felt safe, security con-
cerns were quite serious. Two economists with whom I worked,
one from the International Monetary Fund and another from
the British government, were injured in separate incidents. I
know the British economist, Jacob Nell, the best. He is the type
of person you would want rebuilding your country, with smarts,
energy, common sense, and a cowboy-style straw hat that looks
funny on someone who went to Oxford. On October 26, a 
rocket went through Jacob’s window in the Al Rasheed, flew
over his bed, and exploded in his bathroom. As I write this,
Jacob is back in Britain, recuperating from injuries to his leg.
i eventually finda ride home to the hotel on the night that
Uday and Qusay are killed. A truck comes by driven by a sol-
dier named Tony, who, in an astounding coincidence, is also
detailed to the economics unit. I hop in the front seat, thank
him profusely for the ride, and ask him how his day went. 
“Not that good,” Tony replies. He tells me of the trip he took
with former prisoners of the regime, each of whom had a hand
amputated while in jail. The men had heard a rumor that their
hands had been buried under a tree near the prison. So Tony
drove them to the prison, they dug up the dirt around the tree—
and found nothing. The prisoners rode home discouraged. 
After about five minutes, we arrive at the Al-Rasheed. As I
hold up my identification badge to the troops guarding the ho-
tel’s front gate, I look forward to getting back to my bed. I need
to sleep. Tomorrow is likely to be another long day. S
Chris Foote is an Economist at the Boston Fed.
He worked in Iraq from late June to early Sep-
tember.
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